



Enforced disappearances often result in impunity, which is a “distinctive
trait” of such crimes (UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, 2020 Annual Report, paras. 1, 93). A range of factors can
contribute to States’ unwillingness and/or inability to bring perpetrators to justice.
This can include the jurisdiction of military authorities to investigate, prosecute
and punish gross human rights violations. This post outlines the approaches of
the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID or the
Working Group) and the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED or the
Committee) to military jurisdiction over enforced disappearances in the context of
States’ obligations to investigate and prosecute such crimes.
Military jurisdiction as a pretext for impunity
Military jurisdiction can obstruct investigation and prosecution of gross human
rights violations, thereby preventing accountability and denying victims’ right
to justice. Numerous UN Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions have raised concerns that members of the armed forces
may evade punishment before military courts due to an ill-conceived esprit de
corps (e.g., 1997 Annual Report, para. 97; 2004 Annual Report, para. 49). Indeed,
said UN Special Rapporteur noted in his 2008 Annual Report:
“When extrajudicial executions are committed by military personnel
it usually falls to the national system of military justice to investigate,
prosecute and punish. Yet, historically, the human rights track record of
military justice has been dismal…At its best, military justice has been a
separate and inferior system of justice. At its worst, it has provided a pretext
for impunity…” (para. 48).
Several UN Special Rapporteurs on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers have
also raised concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of military justice,
noting that the military judicial system “is subject to pressure and interference by the
military hierarchy” (2007 Report on the Mission to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, para. 15). Examples include military judges being “threatened or attacked
by members of armed forces as an intimidation tactic to ensure impunity” (ibid, para.
38) or active-duty officers trying their own subordinates for human rights violations
(1996Report on the Mission to Colombia, para. 140).
Examples of military jurisdiction under national legislation
The Committee’s Concluding Observations contain numerous examples of States
where military authorities have jurisdiction under national legislation – either
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expressly or due to a lack of specific exclusion – to investigate and prosecute
enforced disappearances. Regarding investigations on the one hand, there
are examples of military police forces being competent to investigate enforced
disappearances committed in a military context (CED 2014 Concluding Observations
on the Netherlands, para. 18). On the other hand, regarding prosecutions,
some national legal systems provide military courts with the jurisdiction to try
enforced disappearances committed by military personnel in the exercise of their
duties (CED 2017 Concluding Observations on Gabon, para. 23), in war time
(CED 2014 Concluding Observations on Belgium, para. 21) or where members
of the armed forces are accused of an offence under ordinary or military law
(CED 2016 Concluding Observations on Tunisia, para. 20).
Regional and international human rights instruments and standards
At the regional level, Article 9-1 of the 1994 Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearances of Persons (Inter-American Convention) asserts that
“Persons alleged to be responsible for the acts constituting the offense of forced
disappearance of persons may be tried only in the competent jurisdictions of ordinary
law in each state, to the exclusion of all other special jurisdictions, particularly
military jurisdictions”. Furthermore, under Article 9-2 of the Inter-American
Convention, enforced disappearances “shall not be deemed to have been committed
in the course of military duties”.
At the international level, no treaty-based international instrument contains specific
provisions on military jurisdiction over gross human rights violations, such as
enforced disappearances. However, Article 16-2 of the 1992 Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (the 1992 Declaration)
stipulates that persons allegedly responsible for enforced disappearances “shall
be tried only by the competent ordinary courts in each State, and not by any other
special tribunal, in particular military courts”. Article 14 of the 1992 Declaration
requires the prosecution and trial to be conducted by the “competent civil authorities
of that State”.
Notable principles that also address this issue include Principle 29 of
the 2005 Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity and Principles 8-9 of the 2006 Draft
Principles Governing the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals (Decaux
Principles).
UN Working Group on enforced or involuntary disappearances
Under, inter alia, Articles 13 and 14 of the 1992 Declaration, States shall investigate
and prosecute enforced disappearances. In line with Article 16-2 of the 1992
Declaration, the Working Group has recommended that ordinary courts’ jurisdiction
should be guaranteed for human rights violations, regardless of whether the
perpetrator was a member of the armed forces (e.g. WGEID 2007 Mission to
Honduras, paras. 38, 66(a)(iv); 2012 Mission to Pakistan, para. 74). This should be
codified in domestic criminal legislation (WGEID Best practices in national criminal
law on enforced disappearances, para. 57). The Working Group has also highlighted
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that bringing perpetrators to justice before competent civilian courts is a crucial
preventive measure (see, e.g. WGEID 2005 Annual Report, para. 599).
Regarding investigations, the Working Group has recommended that civil
prosecution services conduct serious and prompt investigations into all complaints
of human rights violations and that military prosecution services must be legally
prevented from initiating or continuing investigations (e.g. WGEID 2011 Mission
to Mexico, para. 98). The Working Group elaborated on investigations in its
recent 2020 Report on standards and public policies for an effective investigation of
enforced disappearances, holding:
“under certain circumstances, some States, such as those in post-conflict
situations or States transitioning to democracy, should consider extending
the prohibition of trial by any special tribunal, including a military tribunal,
to include pretrial investigations, in order to restrict the participation of
institutions and agencies that are suspected of committing or having
committed enforced disappearances.” (para. 40).
The Working Group’s rationale is reflected in its assertion that victims and their
relatives are denied access to justice where military justice systems lack the
necessary independence and impartiality to address human rights violations, making
it “extremely difficult to end impunity” (WGEID 2011 Mission to Mexico, para. 38).
UN Committee on enforced disappearances
Under, inter alia, Articles 6 and 12 of the 2006 International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED or the
Convention), State Parties are obliged to investigate and prosecute enforced
disappearances. The Convention does not contain an explicit prohibition on military
jurisdiction over enforced disappearances. This is due to diplomatic negotiations
aimed at adopting the text by consensus (CED 2014 Report on 5thand 6th Session,
para. 16).
However, in 2015, the Committee issued a Statement on enforced disappearances
and military jurisdiction (2015 Statement). Noting its opinion that “military jurisdiction
could limit the effectiveness of investigations, prosecutions and trials of enforced
disappearances” (2015 Statement, para. 2), the Committee reaffirmed military
jurisdiction’s exclusion for gross human rights violations, including enforced
disappearances (2015 Statement, para. 10). In doing so, the Committee took into
account “the provisions of the Convention and the progressive development
of international law in order to assure the consistency in the implementation of
international standards” (2015 Statement, para. 10).
The Committee’s position is underpinned by the notion that the “right to justice for
victims implies respect for the principle of independence and impartiality of the
courts” (2015 Statement, para. 1). Indeed, when addressing military jurisdiction
in its Concluding Observations, the Committee has relied almost exclusively
on Article 11 ICPPED, subsection (3) of which reads: “[a]ny person tried for an
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offence of enforced disappearance shall benefit from a fair trial before a competent,
independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law”.
The Committee has repeatedly held that, as a matter of principle, military courts
cannot provide the independence and impartiality required by the Convention
to hear cases of human rights violations, such as enforced disappearance. It
has therefore consistently recommended that State parties “take the necessary
legislative or other measures to ensure that all cases of enforced disappearance
remain expressly outside military jurisdiction and can be tried only by ordinary
courts” (e.g. CED 2014 Concluding Observations on Belgium, para. 22).
It has made the same recommendation regarding investigations
(e.g. 2013 Concluding Observations on Spain, para. 16). The Committee recently
elaborated on the requirement of independence in the context of national legislation
that did not specifically exclude military courts’ jurisdiction to “investigate allegations
of enforced disappearances committed by military personnel” (CED 2019 Concluding
Observations on Bolivia, para. 18). It recommended that “crimes of enforced
disappearance allegedly committed by members of the armed forces are
investigated and prosecuted by competent, independent and impartial prosecutors
and judges who have no institutional ties to the entity to which the individual under
investigation belongs” (ibid, para. 19).
Conclusion
While the 1992 Declaration explicitly prohibits military jurisdiction to prosecute
enforced disappearances, the Convention is silent on the matter. Nonetheless,
both the Working Group and the Committee have excluded military jurisdiction over
gross human rights violations, including enforced disappearances. In doing so, both
bodies draw on administration of justice principles, notably the requirement of an
independent and impartial court or tribunal. This responds to the fact that military
jurisdiction can hinder investigation and prosecution of gross human rights violations,
thereby preventing accountability and denying victims’ right to justice. By excluding
enforced disappearances from military jurisdiction, the Working Group and the
Committee address a contributing factor of concern in the fight against impunity.
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